"Eilat is a vulnerability that is not talked about. Any reinforcement that will be needed there will take hours"

In the weeks after the war with Iran, Israel's southern resort city returned to being what it loves. The famous hotel strip was full again, this time not with American soldiers but with Israeli vacationers. The beaches were crowded again, the promenade came back to life, and thousands fled to the quiet lagoons of Eilat in search of a few days of respite. The silence was almost deafening, because even the unwanted visitors from Yemen stopped buzzing in the sky. But one morning reminded the vacationers - if any of them even needed a reminder - that Eilat might feel like an island of sanity, but it is still part of a war zone.

Yaakov Kissus stood on the pier, under the Red Rock Hotel, when he heard an alarm from the Navy base and noticed a 'Tzira' boat jumping from the base at an unusual speed. "The moment I saw it leave with a crazy jump, I understood that something unusual was happening," he recalls. Kissus, who served for more than two decades in the Navy reserves, has been operating a sailing center adjacent to the Navy base for 36 years, so he knows the bay almost like the back of his hand.

Minutes later, it was clear where the 'Tzira' had jumped to. A jet ski that was speeding from the direction of Jordan cut diagonally towards the Katzaa beach and tried to penetrate into Israeli territory. A Navy 'Dvora' patrol boat closed in on it while the fighters on its deck opened fire with machine guns, and at the same time, a Magav (Border Police) force was scrambled to the shore. Citizens who went out for a morning walk stopped and watched the drama that was unfolding before their eyes.

While the 'Dvora' was firing at the jet ski, the 'Tzira' used its speed advantage, blocked the escape route, and forced the rider to cut south, parallel to the beach. The fire forced the jet ski to make a sharp turn and flee back to the Jordanian shore. It had already managed to penetrate about two kilometers into Israel's territorial waters before fleeing back and being stopped by a Jordanian police boat that had left the port of Aqaba. "The most important thing is that he didn't manage to reach the shore," says Kissus. As first published on Channel 12 News, the security establishment estimates that the jet ski might not have been manned at all, but was operated remotely as part of an attempt to test the alertness of Israeli defense systems.

Kissus was not particularly moved by the media commotion, and the residents didn't go out of their way either. "You have to know the Eilat residents, they are terribly indifferent," he says. "Let them go to the sea, give them a drink, a little sport, and a little fun in the evening - a great city. Usually, there is no panic here and no fear at all."

However, a few weeks later, a report by Josh Breiner was published in Haaretz, according to which the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, estimated in internal discussions that the next October 7th would be in Eilat. The unusual warning caused many echoes and quite a few question marks. The comparison to the deadliest terrorist attack in the country's history is shocking in itself, all the more so when it refers to a resort city that is geographically isolated from the rest of the country.

According to the report, Bar ordered that the possibility of an attack on Eilat be placed high on the list of priorities. The scenario he drew includes a timed ground invasion, mainly through Jordan and possibly also from the sea, with the assistance of several terrorist organizations, including the Houthis. He even made a secret visit to the city with senior officials in the service and met with local security officials.

The day after the publication, the organization rushed to clarify that there is no information or concrete warning about an intention to harm the city or raid it, but that it is a matter of thorough operational planning and learning the threats. The Shin Bet did not comment on the quote itself but emphasized that as part of the process of entering the position and learning the various threats, the head of the Shin Bet held a tour of Eilat, part of which took place in cooperation with the army, and examined various preparations. "We emphasize that there is no information or concrete warning."

Within the security establishment, there was also criticism, and a security source was quoted as saying that no one knows what intelligence he is relying on. "I also said at the beginning: what, has he lost his mind? Is this what interests him now?" admits Shalom Ben-Hanan, a former division head in the Shin Bet and currently a research fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University. However, after he checked things in the service, he reached a different conclusion: "I am sure that the focus on Eilat did not come at the expense of other arenas. Bar identified a vulnerability that is not talked about. Whoever sees clearly should look precisely at the places that the system devotes less attention to and sometimes even neglects."

According to him, to understand the meaning of the warning, one must separate two things that are very easy to confuse: intelligence information about an actual intention, and an analysis of the arena in the eyes of the enemy. "Always when asking about a change in perception, one must ask if it comes from up-to-date and accurate intelligence, or from an analysis of the arena that comes and says: we have problems, we are not waiting for intelligence."

As far as is known, the security establishment did not receive information that a specific terrorist organization decided to "latch onto" Eilat. The fear stems from weaknesses that any enemy with a pair of eyes can identify: a remote city, surrounded by borders, to which it is difficult to quickly flow large forces. "Eilat was, remained, and will remain the most remote point in Israel," says Ben-Hanan. "Any reinforcement that will be needed there, any emergency, will take hours." In a multi-arena war, when the army is required in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, and Iran, this distance turns from a geographical disadvantage into an operational vulnerability.

The immediate response to this scenario is the 'Lotar Eilat' unit, an elite reserve takeover unit under the 80th Division, which controls the border with Egypt. It is intended to handle complex incidents, including terrorist infiltration, bus hijacking, and barricading with hostages. The unit commander for the past year is Lieutenant Colonel H., a fighter and commander who served 20 years in Shayetet 13.

"The unit was established because of the geographical distance," explains H. "The YAMAM and other units that are supposed to arrive at complex incidents take time, and someone needs to provide a high-quality, fast, and accurate response. In a city that is built on tourism and is far from the center of the country, response time is critical. If we arrive at an incident, we will try to finish it and end it properly, as quickly as possible. We are prepared to deal with complex incidents."

The unit consists of reservists who served as fighters in their regular service. In their daily lives, they are teachers, engineers, hotel workers, and taxi drivers, but one call is enough and within a short time they put on uniforms and become fighters of an elite unit. After the screening, they undergo a dedicated course of about a month, and later additional training that prepares them for fighting in hotels, buses, or on the promenade. "Our designation is first of all the Arava and Eilat area," says H. "We train at a very high frequency, not something a regular reservist usually does."

This lesson has already been written in blood. In August 2011, terrorists infiltrated from Sinai and carried out a combined terrorist attack on Highway 12, about 26 kilometers from Eilat. Eight Israelis were killed and 20 were wounded. Following the attack, a barrier was built on the border with Egypt, but the eastern border remained mostly open.

"The Jordanians, even though there is no border fence with them, carry out very significant counter-activity to prevent infiltration and attacks from their territory into Israel," notes Ben-Hanan. "They make tremendous efforts, but you don't want to rely on these things. That is not what holds up in the end."

The Eilot region surrounds Eilat and stretches along small and isolated settlements. Agricultural lands reach almost to the border line, and in large parts, there is no continuous barrier. Weapons and drug smuggling, sometimes using drones, have already become a matter of routine. The fear is that the familiar criminal route will turn on D-Day into a route for terrorist cells.

"The general warning is strong enough for us to know that we must be aware of it and prepared for it," says the head of the council, Dr. Hanan Ginat. From his point of view, the main threat is not an invasion by the Jordanian army, but the infiltration of Iranian proxies or proxy cells that will take advantage of the vast space. The council demands to strengthen the classification of the settlements and the defense departments and standby squads. The logic is simple: if a major incident occurs simultaneously in Eilat, the military force will not necessarily arrive in time to the settlements in the Arava.

The council has already financed cameras and technological means for covering "dead zones" itself. "We also take into account that what we know, the enemy knows," says Ginat. According to him, out of about one hundred kilometers in his sector, in fifty there is no fence. The Ministry of Defense has begun to promote a barrier on the eastern border as part of a program estimated at about 5.5 billion shekels, but the work is starting in the north. "We saw on October 7th that a fence does not stop everything," he emphasizes. Therefore, the demand is to combine a barrier, surveillance, and a local force that will be able to fight alone in the first hours.

Gabi Kadosh, the former mayor of Eilat, remembers a different reality. "When we signed the peace agreement, it was a time of dream and trust. We even cut the fences, there was a different atmosphere," he says. "I was happy when I traveled with Rabin to Washington to sign the peace agreement, but I cannot say that I feel today as I felt then." From his point of view, Bar's words were a wake-up call that must be taken 100 percent seriously.

The border is not the only thing that attracts the attention of security officials. The Shin Bet was also interested in the increase in the number of Israeli Arabs who are moving to live in Eilat. The police do not identify a security threat stemming from the trend at this stage, but are concerned about the entry of criminal organizations into the city. However, so far, no unusual increase in crime has been recorded in Eilat.

A few months ago, the commander of the Eilat district in the police, Colonel Alon Kalfon, said that Eilat is a mixed city in the making. "There are a lot, a lot of Arabs here," said Kalfon. According to another report in Haaretz, Bar also referred to the trend and said at a cabinet meeting a few months ago that there is an attempt by Arabs to take over Eilat.

Here too, extreme caution is required: the very movement of Arab citizens to the city is not a security warning. "I don't want to just blame the growing Arab population, because it could be that they are all excellent citizens," emphasizes Ben-Hanan. According to him, the fear is that the change in the composition of the population will make it easier for hostile elements to operate in the city without standing out and arousing suspicion. "When you have a growing Arab population, it is also easier for strangers to blend into it. Suppose an illegal resident from Judea and Samaria arrives and decides to carry out an attack precisely in Eilat - it will probably be easier for him to blend into the city."

To this is added the lesson of 'Guardian of the Walls', when the riots in the mixed cities became a security arena in its own right. "If after 'Guardian of the Walls' everyone understood that one needs to look at Ramle, Lod, and Jaffa differently, then if Eilat is becoming a mixed city - it should join the list," says Ben-Hanan. However, he clarifies that this is an analysis of the vulnerabilities in the city, and not intelligence information about a planned attack.

The former mayor Kadosh raises another concern: the Jordanian workers employed in the hotels. "In a hotel, you cannot know what might happen. The security establishment checks their past, but history has already proven that this is not always enough," he says. According to him, the supervision of their movement is also not always maintained: "They are not supposed to wander around the city as they please, but to stay in their work area - and even that does not always happen."

Eilat is not a destination like all destinations. In July-August, an average of about 140,000 people stay there per day. Harming it will not only be a human disaster, but a moral and economic blow to a place that depends almost entirely on the sense of security. "Even a pinpoint attack could damage Eilat's good name," says Kadosh. "Tourism needs calmness and a sense of security."

The municipality broadcasts reassuring messages: there is no immediate warning, and the city and security forces are prepared for any scenario. Infiltration from the sea is supposed to meet fast boats, fighters, sensors that detect vessels, and even divers. After the jet ski incident, the 915th Division held an exercise simulating terrorist infiltration on jet skis from the eastern border. In the sky, after seven UAV hits and one Iranian missile during the war, no one treats Yemen as a distant point on the map anymore.

And yet, Eilat continues to operate according to Eilat's rules. The hotels are full, the attractions are operating, and if an alarm sounds, the vacationers enter the protected space and return after a short time to the sea. Kissus did not hear about cancellations following the jet ski or after Bar's words. "Most of the tourism is Israeli, and they are not afraid of anything," he says. "Even when there were missiles and alarms from UAVs here, people entered the protected rooms and after that returned to the sea."

Kadosh hears a different tune. "I am not in a place that tells the residents: calm down, everything is fine," he says. "You arrive in Eilat, talk to the residents and enter social networks - and this is the topic that occupies them. There is concern, and the question everyone is asking is what will happen."

In the Eilat municipality, they chose not to be interviewed for the article, but stated that in Eilat, the routine is maintained, and the city is full as every summer.

The details appearing in the article were approved for publication by the Military Censor.