Half a term under fire: Trust in Zamir is high - but the political trap is around the corner
A new study by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), which examined the tenure of Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, determines: trust in him is high - but conditional. The trap: every decision, however professional, may be perceived as political. In the remainder of his term, the challenges will be maintaining the IDF as a state army, handling the manpower crisis, and the erosion of command authority.
If the term of Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir is not extended from three years to four, next month he will reach the halfway point of his tenure. A study by the Army-Society Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), which examined the beginning of his tenure, reveals a complex picture: despite the confrontations with the political echelon, Zamir still enjoys an exceptionally high level of trust among the Israeli public - but this trust is also conditional and colored in political hues. The study illustrates the trap in which the Chief of Staff finds himself: almost every decision or statement of his is currently examined through a political prism, even when it is entirely professional.
The four INSS researchers who wrote the study note that the roots of the tension between the political and military echelons go back to the period of the protests against the judicial reform, during which the senior command of the IDF was presented in parts of the political discourse as identifying with the left-wing camp. The tension naturally intensified following the failures of October 7 and the struggle over the narrative of responsibility. The fact that it did not subside even after the change of Chiefs of Staff, the researchers argue, indicates that this is not just a personal confrontation with one Chief of Staff or another, but a deeper tension regarding the institution of the Chief of Staff and the degree of independence of the professional military echelon from the political one.
Perceived as convenient for the government
When Zamir entered the Chief of Staff's office in March 2025, he was perceived as a relatively convenient appointment for the current government, partly because he had previously served as the military secretary to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and was his preferred candidate for the position. Precisely because of this, his appointment was received with suspicion in other parts of the public, who feared that Zamir would be a "trusted man" of the political echelon. However, within a short time, Zamir also found himself in sharp confrontations with the government over professional and value-based decisions. One of the most prominent of these was his opposition to the "Gideon's Chariots II" plan in the Gaza Strip, partly due to manpower considerations and the risk to soldiers and hostages.
In the eyes of the researchers, this dynamic reinforces the argument that the tension is not personal, but concerns the boundaries between the government's authority and the army's professional independence.
In a sense, the trust in Zamir also flipped: he entered the position under suspicion from parts of the center and left that he would be "Netanyahu's Chief of Staff," but as the confrontations with the government intensified, trust in him among the right began to erode.
One of the central issues raised in the study is the "choosing wars" policy associated with Zamir - his attempt to avoid unnecessary confrontations with the political echelon and to keep the army neutral and state-oriented. However, according to the analysis, this policy does not necessarily protect the IDF from politicization. Sometimes the opposite happens: laconic responses and avoiding taking a clear position on charged value-based and public issues are interpreted as weakness, as fear of confrontation, or as tacit agreement.
Thus, an almost built-in trap is created for Zamir: when he confronts the government, he is attacked from one side of the political map. When he avoids confrontation, he may lose trust on the other side. In other words, the attempt to remain outside of politics does not necessarily prevent it from entering the army.
Did not come with a "blank check"
INSS surveys also illustrate the volatility in trust in the Chief of Staff: in March 2025, upon entering the position, 59% of respondents expressed high trust in him. In June, against the backdrop of Operation Am Im Kalvi, the figure jumped to a peak of 81%. Afterward, trust eroded, then rose again with the outbreak of Operation Shaagat Haari, and last May stood at 69%. That is, similar to the IDF as a whole, Zamir also enjoys a distinct "rally 'round the flag" effect during wartime, part of which fades over time.
And yet, compared to the other figures examined, Zamir enjoys a significantly higher level of trust than the political echelon. While trust in PM Netanyahu fluctuated during most of the first year of Zamir's tenure around 30%-40%, and trust in Defense Minister Israel Katz around 30% - trust in the Chief of Staff was much higher. Only the IDF as an institution enjoyed higher trust throughout the period.
Survey data well illustrate how trust in the Chief of Staff has also become political: in January 2025, even before his appointment, 48% of respondents who defined themselves as right-wing believed that the next Chief of Staff would be appointed based on professional considerations alone, compared to 20% in the center and only 10% on the left. Later, the trend changed: as Zamir confronted the political echelon, trust in him among the right eroded, and from late 2025, the rate of trust in him among the center and left was higher.
However, even in the center-left camp, Zamir did not receive a "blank check." There, other criticism arose, regarding what was perceived as the army's avoidance of confrontation with the political echelon on value-based issues. One of the prominent examples was his decision not to promote the former IDF Spokesperson, Brig. Gen. (res.) Daniel Hagari.
In an INSS survey conducted in March 2025, 58% of the public believed that Hagari's non-promotion stemmed from the tension between him and the Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and only 29% estimated that the decision was made based on professional considerations. From the IDF's perspective, this is a troubling figure: even if the decision was entirely professional, a significant part of the public interpreted it through the question of political loyalty.
Difficulty in enforcement against deserters
But Zamir's challenge does not end with his relations with the government. The study points to another, and perhaps deeper, problem: the erosion of command authority and discipline in the IDF. Among other things, the difficulty in enforcement against draft dodgers and deserters, phenomena of ideological expressions in uniform, and the loosening of discipline in the field are mentioned.
A prominent case study was the patch affair: a Nahal soldier who wore a patch with the inscription "Mashiach" during a tour by the Chief of Staff was sentenced by the brigade commander to 30 days in military prison and dismissal from combat. After a public campaign and pressure from political figures, his punishment was commuted to 20 days in military prison.
According to the researchers, the significance goes far beyond the punishment of a single soldier: when external political pressure succeeds in influencing a command decision, it may convey a message to commanders and soldiers that the military hierarchy is not necessarily the final word. The public, it seems, identifies the problem: in an INSS survey from May 2026, 59% of the Jewish public expressed concern about the erosion of discipline and values in the IDF.
Alongside this, on Zamir's desk lies the manpower crisis, perhaps the most complex problem of the IDF today. The reserve system is exhausted after years of fighting and has become, as defined by the study, a kind of "involuntary permanent system" for those serving. Simultaneously, the army is dealing with a crisis in the permanent service system and with a growing sense of inequality surrounding the issue of Haredi conscription.
At the beginning of Zamir's tenure, by the way, only 8% of the public marked the manpower crisis as the Chief of Staff's most urgent task - but in practice, it quickly became clear how much it affects the IDF's ability to continue fighting over time.
In the operational arena, too, the picture is complex. During Zamir's tenure, public skepticism grew regarding the purpose of continuing the fighting in Gaza and the ability to reach further achievements. On the other hand, in his time, Iran became a central arena of fighting. After Operation Am Im Kalvi, 70.5% of the public expressed high satisfaction with the campaign's achievements, but after Operation Shaagat Haari, the rate of those satisfied with the military achievements dropped to 42%, while satisfaction with the political achievements was even lower.
Towards the second half of his tenure, the researchers warn against the intensification of the politicization processes of the IDF, mainly against the backdrop of the approaching election campaign. Alongside this, Zamir will be required to deal with the manpower crisis in the regular, permanent, and reserve forces, and with the erosion of discipline and command authority.
