The architect of terror who cracked the IDF: The rise and fall of Hamas's "Head of Aman"

When Yahya Sinwar was released from Israeli prison as part of the "Shalit deal," his brother Muhammad acted to introduce him to the new reality in the Gaza Strip: the organization's leadership, military and governing capabilities, and senior field operatives. One of them was Muhammad Uda. According to testimonies and documents, Sinwar left prison with a clear strategy: to connect with the leadership while surrounding himself with loyalists.

He had known Uda, a native of the Jabalia refugee camp who was already connected to a radical ideology against Israel, since the late eighties. With the establishment of the Al-Majd ("Glory") force, whose purpose was to locate collaborators with Israel, interrogate them, and threaten them, Uda took a central part in the field activity and brutal actions.

At the beginning of the Second Intifada, in 2000, Uda officially joined the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and even then stood out mainly due to his ties with the leadership of the terrorist organization, including Ahmed Yassin, Nizar Awadallah, and Mohammed Deif.

He climbed the ladder of positions and was appointed battalion commander of central Jabalia, responsible for the production of rockets and sabotage equipment for a short period, and commander of the Northern Brigade. His closeness to the Sinwar brothers upgraded his status, and he was appointed head of the military intelligence staff and a member of the Hamas military council. One of the testimonies to the closeness between the Sinwar family and Uda was reflected in photos and videos found by the forces of the 162nd Division during the first land conquests.

After the elimination of Muhammad Sinwar, Uda refused to accept the position of commander of the military wing because he knew that Israeli intelligence would focus on him. After the elimination of Izz ad-Din al-Haddad, the senior leadership of the terrorist organization in Qatar left him no choice. Ten days after his appointment, he was eliminated. According to sources in the Southern Command, he tried to stabilize the ranks, demonstrate control, and issue orders, but made a few too many mistakes.

"At the time of the elimination, he was one of the most senior in Hamas. Over 30 years in the military wing, he did the entire sequence of positions and had the perfect resume - both a brigade commander and head of military intelligence, their equivalent to our head of Aman," explained an officer from Aman in a conversation with Walla. "He was a very significant person in the planning of October 7 because of the intelligence matter he was responsible for. We all know that there was a very meticulous, sophisticated, and Sisyphean intelligence gathering for the planning needs of October 7, and Muhammad Uda is the person who led this intelligence effort for years."

The Aman officer noted that from the beginning of the war, Uda was in the crosshairs of the Shin Bet and Aman, due to his value in analyzing the vulnerabilities of the IDF and influencing the decision-making process of the Hamas leadership.

According to a security source, "Muhammad Uda served as the head of Hamas military intelligence, responsible for gathering intelligence for the purpose of promoting attacks, formulating a situation assessment, and harming the freedom of action of the State of Israel. During the war, Uda took a direct part in managing the fighting, holding hostages, and rehabilitating Hamas capabilities. In addition, Uda was one of the last architects of October 7 and was involved in the planning and execution of the attack."

The security source also revealed that the attack that led to his elimination was carried out after prolonged tracking by the Shin Bet and the IDF. As part of closing the circle on Uda and his accomplices, an apartment in Gaza City near his hideout was attacked, where a Hamas military operative who raided on October 7 and was part of his close circle was staying.

"He managed to relatively evade for a long time," the intelligence officer said. "They tried all sorts of attempts to find him during the war, and indeed on the day of the elimination, some turning point arrived. Information arrived that made it possible to understand his location, eliminate him, and put Hamas into an interesting phase, where it is really no longer so clear who will be the replacement as commander of the military wing. They need to decide whether the model of a head of the military wing is the model they want, or perhaps it is right for them to hide the existence of the head of the wing for fear of elimination."

The officer from Aman hinted at the future of the policy of targeted killings in the Gaza Strip: "Both Uda and Izz ad-Din al-Haddad were eliminated while hiding in surface assets. This shows how these people do not care about the lives of others, because they were together with their families when we attacked them. It is very difficult to live underground for years, and even in this space one can be eliminated."

The elimination of Uda dealt a heavy blow to the organization, since he was responsible for the intelligence revolution of Hamas and became the "intelligence brain" of the organization. The collection of huge amounts of loot materials during the ground maneuver revealed how he integrated and upgraded the military collection system against the IDF after the failed operation of Aman, "Tropical Fruits," in the heart of Khan Yunis.

Uda insisted on building towers and posts opposite the IDF, some of them within a range of a hundred meters from the border fence - a project called "Hourglass," in which field operatives were required to record every action of IDF soldiers. To stabilize the collection work, he made sure to supply the operatives at the positions with food and ordered frequent visits to emphasize the importance of collecting information on the IDF.

Collection was carried out using binoculars, night vision equipment, and later - fixed cameras. The huge information flowed to his desk, and he produced from it valuable information about the IDF, which thought its walls were high and underestimated the enemy. Security sources claim that there are documents revealing the extreme fanaticism for the collection processes.

In the Southern Command before October 7, they took comfort in the fact that all Hamas posts were manned around the clock, estimating that if the terrorist organizations carried out attacks, they would have to evacuate the posts. But Hamas did not evacuate a single post. Uda managed to crack the organizational culture of the IDF: to identify the points of weakness, to point out the centers from which the Nukhba forces would break into Israeli territory, and to estimate the response times of the IDF forces.

"One of the biggest decapitation operations in terms of command and control eliminations in history was carried out here," the officer described the chain of targeted killings. "I have a picture in my office of company commanders and above on October 7, and a very large part of it has red X's. This has long-term effects on the professionalism of the organization. We intend to continue to weaken it, erode it, and make it difficult for it in every possible way, and hope that the totality of these pressures will lead it to agree to its disarmament."

"In the current situation, you may create the possibility for a new dynamic in the leadership that can challenge cohesion. Uda himself was a factor with a lot of knowledge, and his elimination took away a capability from Hamas. Hamas is a very organized movement, but in the end it turns out that not everything is in computers - some of the things are in the heads of human beings."

When I asked the Aman officer to analyze the military wing, he replied that there are still professional factors with influence on the ground - such as Imad Akel, Hussein Fayyad, Muhammad Barin, Gaza Brigade Commander Muhannad Rajab, and Muhammad Barim. Also, there are former battalion commanders who are now brigade commanders - a very serious group that underwent training in the days when Hamas had military colleges.

The IDF is aware of the phenomenon of recruiting young operatives aged 15-16. A veteran security source said: "One must not ridicule or underestimate the process. In Hamas, they look five-six years ahead - they are preparing them for 'Al-Aqsa Flood 2'. They have returned to the first stage, to the guerrilla stage and the Dawa stage. They will raise a generation anew. They will not rush to lead a company of 16-year-old fighters to conquer an IDF post, but in a few years, they will have a professional company, battalion, and brigade."

"Even if their territory is limited, they will learn the vulnerabilities of the line that the IDF protects. Why will it be easy for them? Because the IDF is static. Easy to learn, exactly like before October 7. They knew exactly everything: when a patrol goes out and comes in, when there is an alert. And they played with us when they initiated sending children to the fence, and when the observers warned that something didn't look right, their information fell on deaf ears. I'm not coming to cry about what was. I'm looking forward, and saying - Hamas is returning to the force-building stage, and they are at its first stage."