The hidden religious conflict: what are the Shiites in Lebanon not saying about Hezbollah?
The struggle over the character of the Shiite community in Lebanon has been going on for decades. Senior clerics have presented an alternative to the concept of 'Velayat-e Faqih' (Guardianship of the Jurist), maintained independence from Iran, and opposed Hezbollah. Behind the political dispute lies a deep struggle over the question: who is authorized to speak on behalf of the Shiites in Lebanon?
When people in Israel think of a Shiite cleric in Lebanon, the image that arises almost automatically is that of a cleric identified with Hezbollah. The connection between religion, the organization, and Iran has become so strong over the years that it is easy to forget an important fact: it was precisely from within the Shiite religious establishment in Lebanon that some of the deepest objections to the worldview represented by Hezbollah emerged.
To understand this, one must return to the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, which Imam Musa al-Sadr established in 1967. Its establishment was a defining moment for the Shiites in Lebanon: for the first time, an official institution was created to represent them within the Lebanese state. However, after the disappearance of al-Sadr and the rise of Hezbollah, a broader struggle gradually emerged over the question of who is authorized to speak on behalf of the Shiites — the Lebanese community institutions or a political-military movement committed also to the religious leadership in Iran.
One of the people who exemplified this tension was Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who headed the Supreme Shiite Council until his death in 2001. Shams al-Din was not 'anti-Hezbollah' in the simple sense of the word, and even supported resistance against Israel. His importance lay elsewhere: he proposed a Shiite concept that placed the state, citizenship, and the belonging of Shiites to the countries in which they live at the center — a significant alternative to the Iranian 'Velayat-e Faqih' concept upon which Hezbollah relies.
Also, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, one of the senior Shiite clerics in Lebanon, maintained religious independence in relation to Iran and did not fully accept the Iranian model of 'Velayat-e Faqih'. The very existence of an independent Shiite religious authority center demonstrated that even within the environment identified with Hezbollah, there was no absolute ideological uniformity.
In the next generation, the clash became much more open. Sheikh Ali al-Amin, who served as the Shiite Mufti of Tyre and Jabal Amel, spoke out against the 'Velayat-e Faqih' concept, against Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war, and against subjecting the Shiites in Lebanon to the Iranian project. Alongside him, religious figures and intellectuals such as Hani Fahs worked to build a Shiite identity based on citizenship, pluralism, and coexistence within Lebanon.
The importance of these voices is greater than the number of people they manage to recruit. Hezbollah is not just an armed party; it also relies on a system of religious legitimation. Therefore, when criticism comes from a Shiite cleric, it touches a particularly sensitive point: it undermines the claim that Hezbollah is not only the dominant political force among the Shiites, but also the natural representative of their religious worldview.
The dispute within the Shiite society in Lebanon, therefore, is not just about Hezbollah's weapons or its relations with Iran. Beneath it, a deeper struggle has been taking place for decades: who holds the authority to define what the Lebanese Shiite path is at all.
The author is a researcher of Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Shiite theology. She is a lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science at Ariel University and a research fellow at the Mecarc Institute.
