The Turkish Strategy: How Erdogan Plans to Seize Control of Lebanon
Ankara seeks to capitalize on the weakening of Hezbollah to expand its influence in Lebanon and disrupt the rapprochement between Beirut and Israel. If Ahmad al-Sharaa's forces defeat Hezbollah, Israel will face Turkish presence not only in Syria but also on its northern border.
The Middle East has undergone radical changes since October 7, 2023, with Israel directly or indirectly involved in most of them. Regional events follow a domino effect, resembling a complex chess game.
One of the most significant moves by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was utilizing his proxy in Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), to orchestrate a coup against Bashar al-Assad shortly after the conclusion of Operation Northern Arrows against Hezbollah. Ankara understood that with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah weakened, no one could halt their momentum.
Trump: Al-Sharaa "will do a better job than Israel"
About a year and a half has passed since the Syrian coup, which was the product of long-term Turkish investment. Al-Sharaa and his fighters could not have survived in the Idlib enclave without constant supplies of money, mercenaries, and food from Turkey. Today, Israel is in direct contact with the Lebanese government, Hezbollah is pushed out of the south, and al-Sharaa is viewed by the West as a viable partner.
On the sidelines of the G7 summit in France, US President Donald Trump suggested that Syria should handle Hezbollah, adding that al-Sharaa "will do a better job than Israel." This implies a harsh purge of Shiite elements in Lebanon. For Trump, using Syrian forces is a way to eliminate Hezbollah without risking American lives.
Make no mistake: this strategy was designed in Ankara. Previously, Turkey blocked Washington's plans to use the Kurdish underground (PJAK) against Iran, fearing a Kurdish national awakening. Now, Erdogan seeks to realize his neo-Ottoman foreign policy.
Erdogan seeks to profit from Trump's interests
The Turkish model of proxy governance through puppet regimes has proven more efficient than the Iranian model of using non-state actors. By controlling authorities in Syria, Libya, and Somalia, Ankara secures political, economic, and military gains. In Lebanon, Erdogan sees a dual opportunity: access to reconstruction capital through Turkish companies and strengthening his position to secure F-35 fighter jets from Washington.
Israel is not merely a bystander for Erdogan. When Israel recognized the independence of Somaliland, Turkey immediately deployed F-16 fighters to Mogadishu, cementing its presence. This tactic of "permanent presence" is a hallmark of Turkish foreign policy.
Risks for Israel
Ankara is actively cozying up to Beirut. The recent visit of Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati to Turkey, where he was presented with his grandfather's memoirs, highlights the Ottoman vector of their policy. Israel cannot remain passive in the face of a potential invasion of Lebanon by al-Sharaa's army. If Turkey uses the Syrian army to defeat Hezbollah, Israel will face Turkish influence on its own borders. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's upcoming visit to Washington may be the last chance to halt this scenario.
