INSS Simulation Prepares Israel for Election Security and Disinformation Threats

Dozens of senior figures from security, technology, law, regulation, communications, academia, and civil society gathered last week at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) for an election simulation ahead of the upcoming 26th Knesset elections. Participants practiced scenarios involving foreign, domestic, and illicit influence before the vote and on election day, as well as a situation where one of the parties refuses to accept the results.

The simulation was organized by the INSS, headed by former Military Intelligence Directorate chief Maj. Gen. (Res.) Tamir Hayman, in cooperation with the Israel Internet Association and the Shamgar Center at Tel Aviv University. Similar simulations have been conducted in past election cycles, but this marked the first time journalists were granted a glimpse into the process.

"The feeling is that this election is a decisive battle, making it vulnerable to influence from all directions, especially by our enemies who are aware of internal boiling tensions. We are like the boy with his finger in the dike, trying to do our part to stop it," Hayman said at the opening.

Simulating Election Crisis Management

Former Supreme Court Deputy President Justice Hanan Melcer played the role of the Central Election Committee chairman, a position currently held by Supreme Court Deputy President Justice Noam Solberg. Former Deputy Attorney General Adv. Raz Nizri served as the committee's legal advisor. Former senior officials from the Shin Bet, the National Security Council (NSC), the National Cyber Directorate, the State Attorney's Office, and other bodies played their current counterparts.

Representatives of a special team established within the Election Committee to deal with undue influence risks observed the simulation to adopt insights and potential response strategies. "We are aware of the issues and gaps that arose, and our job is not to remain complacent. Therefore, we are conducting 'war games' with various security bodies," one representative said.

Three main threat vectors were analyzed during the simulation, which was coordinated by Dr. Dudi Siman Tov, a senior researcher at the INSS:

1. The days and hours before the opening of the ballot boxes, when publishing polls and campaigning is legally prohibited. The digital reality creates gray-area legal challenges, such as trend polls leaked online, betting reports on Polymarket, and paid influencers promoting a "personal opinion" in favor of a party.

2. Election day itself: Generating chaos by mixing real reports with fake news, such as incitement against Arab voters, AI-generated audio and video reporting security incidents to suppress turnout in specific areas, and fake overloads on the Israel Police's 100 emergency hotline.

3. The post-election period and de-legitimization of results: Scenarios involving the spread of "evidence of vote rigging" by foreign accounts, and a party declaring it does not recognize the results, alongside fears that a loss of trust could spill over into street violence.

Recommendations and Digital Preparedness

Idan Ring, Vice President of Community at the Israel Internet Association, presented data regarding increased reliance on WhatsApp and social media in Israel, warning that public readiness to counter manipulation remains low. Another participant warned of potential deepfake phone calls released on the eve of the election, mimicking figures like Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, and Mansour Abbas discussing a coalition backed by Arab parties.

To counter such threats, Melcer suggested that the Election Committee summon representatives of major tech platforms and AI chatbot developers for preliminary talks. "When I called Facebook as committee chairman, they arrived in a private jet within 24 hours," he noted.

Participants also emphasized the importance of establishing a professional public communications apparatus for the committee, potentially led by a trusted public figure, to flood the public sphere with factual truths from official sources. Prof. Niva Elkin-Koren, head of the Shamgar Center, suggested adopting the Home Front Command's spokesperson model during emergencies, placing representatives in TV studios to respond rapidly to rumors and disinformation.

Finally, Melcer warned against potential bottlenecks at polling stations and raised concerns regarding the counting of hundreds of thousands of "double envelopes" at the Knesset building, suggesting the count be moved to a neutral location such as Binyanei HaUma to prevent manipulation risks.